Performance of management contracts in small towns water services by C. Tumusiime (7228559) & Cyrus Njiru (7177391)
TUMUSIIME and NJIRU
225
30th WEDC International Conference, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 2004
PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACHES TO WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
Performance of management contracts in  
small towns water services
C. Tumusiime, Uganda and C. Njiru, UK
Introduction
Governments in developing countries face an increasing chal-
lenge to improve water services through strategies that are 
sustainable in economic, social and environmental terms. In 
economic terms, this challenge implies that the provision and 
maintenance of infrastructure conforms to acceptable service 
standards. This has led to increasing international interest in 
private sector participation in the urban water sector through 
management contracts and other public-private partnerships 
in the last few years. Involving the private sector in the water 
service delivery, which has traditionally been dominantly by 
the public sector, has required that Governments carry out 
substantial reforms in their public sector services. 
Uganda has a current population of 24.7 million of which 
only 12% live in urban areas, and the rest (88%) live in 
rural areas and small growth centres with population of 500 
- 5,000 people. In Uganda, the coverage of safe water supply 
currently stands at 55% and 60% for rural and urban water 
supply respectively.
The Uganda Government through the Directorate of Wa-
ter Development (DWD) of the Ministry of Water, Lands 
and Environment (MWLE) initiated reform processes in a 
background of low water and sanitation coverage in 1997, 
after a number of unsuccessful initiatives of developing 
mechanisms for improving water services to the growing 
number of small towns. Such initiatives included community 
management arrangements and the decentralisation of urban 
water service delivery to local governments. The policy of 
institutional reform was intended to increase private sector 
Although national and international institutions have put much effort in the field of water supply improvement during the 
last few years, coverage figures are still low. Many developing countries are taking initiatives to develop mechanisms 
of improving delivery of water supply services. One of the initiatives being employed is delegated management of water 
services to the private sector, through management contracts. Uganda started water sector reforms in 1997 and took steps 
to increase involvement of the private sector in management of its urban water services through management contracts 
in 2001. In Uganda, only 60% of urban areas and 55% of rural areas have access to improved water services. Against 
this background, this paper reports on research undertaken in Uganda, with the objective of analysing the performance of 
management contracts in the recent and still on-going reform and private sector participation process of the water sector. 
The research, which was undertaken as part of an MSc study, followed a case study methodology, and comprised a litera-
ture review, customer surveys, focussed group discussions and key informant interviews. The paper presents the research 
findings, and concludes that well planned and designed management contracts can potentially improve performance of 
small towns water systems for the benefit of the users of services.
involvement in water and sanitation services delivery, operat-
ing commercially viable services in the towns, thus reducing 
the government’s burden for managing these services. 
The reform process and Private sector 
participation in Uganda’s water sector
Implementation of management contracts as part of the 
reform process through private sector participation started 
in the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) 
under the Kampala Revenue Improvement Project (KRIP) in 
1997. For the small towns, PSP started in May 2001, when 
local management contractors commenced operations in 9 
small towns where the World Bank (IDA) had supported 
the capital development works to refurbish water supply 
infrastructure. By January 2003, a total of 24 small towns 
had contracted private sector operators through management 
contracts, with the Government targeting to have all small 
town water supplies gazetted by December 2003 and placed 
under private sector management contracts by March 2005. 
The institutional and legal framework for the implementation 
of management contracts is laid out in the Local Governments 
Act (1997) and the Water Statute (1995), with supporting 
institutional contracts and Government regulations. The 
institutional framework is presented in Figure 1.
Defining small towns in Uganda
”Small towns” in Uganda are defined as having populations 
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of 5,000 - 15,000 inhabitants, characterized by a highly 
concentrated settlement core, with a scattered rural nature 
part under the same administrative structure referred to as 
the fringe, and normally established with Town Councils as 
the Local Government. 
The research objectives and 
methodology 
Research on the performance of management contracts in 
Uganda was carried out in 2003 as part of an MSc degree at 
Loughborough University. The research objectives were to; 
(a) assess the performance of water supply management con-
tracts including their effect on individual users, communities, 
institutions, and the political environment, and; (b) identify 
and recommend appropriate areas of improvements in the 
engagement of the private sector in management of small 
town water supply services, using Uganda as a test case. 
The methodology adopted was a case study, within which 
other social research methods based on both quantitative and 
qualitative processes were employed, involving: 
(i)  Household level customer surveys;
(ii)  Focused group discussions with community 
 members;
(iii) In-depth interviews with key informants; and,
(iv) Observations within the community on the water 
 supply distribution and accessibility of services.
Appropriate performance indicators and service character-
istics were used in the design of the household questionnaire. 
Group discussions and key informant interviews were used 
to determine the control of resources, decision-making and 
levels of service delivery. The data were recorded and ana-
lysed from the various sources detailed above. Responses 
from the customer surveys were analysed using the “Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists” (SPSS) software, and results 
Figure 1. Institutional relationships in  
Uganda’s reform and PSP process 
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were used to provide a basis of customer satisfaction survey, 
and correlated with other methods of data collection above 
to arrive at converging lines of the research.
Research findings
During the field data collection, a total of 80 respondents 
were selected from two representative small towns of Lugazi 
and Lyantonde, with diversity in main piped water supply 
sources, differing main commercial activities, different 
population characteristics and location within the country. 
In addition, a total of 32 males and 37 females in both towns 
participated in focused group discussions, and 17 key inform-
ants were interviewed. There was no identified variation in 
the household size between the results of the survey and the 
2002 Uganda National Population and Housing Census, both 
depicting average sizes of 4.7 and 4.5 respectively. The results 
indicated an average household water use of approximately 
18 litres per person per day, apparently indicating no effect 
of the change in management of water services (from public 
to private) on household water consumption. 
Trends in water source use
There was identified a positive trend in water source usage 
from traditional sources (such as springs located in danger-
ously steep valleys in Lugazi and congested handpumps) to 
piped water supply under management contracts. Many more 
people are willing to shift from the current water sources to 
higher levels of service, but these are limited by the number 
of connections. The management contracts provide that the 
Water Authorities and DWD are responsible for the provi-
sion of materials for extending services to communities, and 
delays in delivery of these materials is seen by the private 
operators as a delay or denial to the communities to access 
safe piped water supplies and increase the coverage.
Service delivery indicators
The opinions of users of services and their level of satis-
faction provide essential information about the operation 
of a service. The indicators of service delivery are central 
to the whole concept of assessing the performance of the 
management contracts. The quality of service to customers 
was determined by focusing on the various dimensions of 
service characteristics such as water availability, water qual-
ity, water pressure, and customer relations. 
Accessibility of households to water sources
There has been a great reduction in the distances of the 
households to their main water source in both towns under 
the management contracts. This is attributed to the increase 
in the number of private connections, also in an effort by the 
management operators to increase their customer base. It is 
appreciated by all the respondents irrespective of whether 
or not they are aware of the existence of the management 
contracts. To some extent, the increase in connections that 
occurred was financed from the Government’s financial and 
material transfers, and there are indications to show that 
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this policy is still in progress though delayed by release of 
capital development funds from the public exchequer. All the 
management contracts have a built in incentive of expand-
ing coverage through bonus payments for new connections, 
and the billing fee per connection. The assessment therefore 
concludes that the management contracts in both cases had 
a positive impact in improving water supply coverage to the 
small town communities.
Continuity of water supply 
Perhaps the biggest achievement under the private manage-
ment operators is ensuring some degree of continuity of water 
supplies. Continuity was used as a measure of reliability 
of the water supply system and expressed as a proportion 
of time on a daily basis that water is available in the water 
supply distribution system. The continuity of supply has 
important implications for consumers. When the water supply 
is discontinuous or intermittent, households may be forced 
to use the alternative sources that are of less quality and 
less convenient. Discontinuous supplies also lead to water 
being stored in containers in the houses leading to possible 
sources of contamination.
Continuity of supply is a set target of the Performance 
Contracts, and there are disincentives within the contracts to 
the contrary. This indicates how responsive the separation of 
roles of monitoring service delivery between the small town 
administrations and the private operators can be effective. 
Nevertheless, interruptions in service are still reported to 
continue to occur, either as a result of unexpected electricity 
power breaks (power outage) or as a result of planned repair 
and extension works. This notwithstanding, the research 
concludes that the involvement of the private operators in 
the water sector in Uganda had a positive impact on the 
continuity of water supply services.
Reliability of supply
There were two identified perspectives in reliability of service. 
One is the reliability in terms of services at water outlets, 
which has a direct effect on the mode and control of distri-
bution of water, and reliability in terms of water production 
that reflects on the direct control of the private operators. 
The private operators are not responsible for operations of 
private connections including services to those who collect 
water from these outlets. 
There was noted an improvement in reliability of water 
supply in both towns, following the engagement of the 
management operators. A substantial proportion of those 
who do not consider their water supplies reliable collect 
water from neighbours’ taps that are outside the control of 
the private operators. Reliability of supplies is therefore 
considered to have improved with long lasting effects in 
the communities.
Water quality 
There was no implied change in water quality for the two 
towns before and during the implementation of the manage-
ment contract. The result for Lugazi reports user satisfaction 
in the water quality parameter, while for Lyantonde, a bigger 
proportion of users perceive their water to be of poor qual-
ity before and during implementation of the management 
contract due to the hardness. It may be argued that hardness 
affects user acceptance than it does to health effects, leading 
to quality test reports from the private operators indicating 
qualifying results against set standards. It can be further ar-
gued that the water is clearer (with less turbidity), free from 
bacteriological contamination in Lyantonde but the ‘quality 
of water for laundry purposes is not guaranteed’.
Cost of water and tariff policies
The cost of water may exert a profound influence on the use 
of the water source. It is a key determinant of affordability, 
because it may discourage use of sufficient quantities of 
water for good personal hygiene, or it can make communi-
ties revert to the traditional unsafe sources. 
It was noted in both cases that there has been no effect of 
the management contracts on the cost of water. The small 
towns authorities, in consultation with DWD fixed the tariffs 
in both cases before the commencement of the management 
contracts. These values were not altered over the duration 
of the contracts. 
There is no uniform tariff structure in the two towns, and 
within Uganda. It is even not uniform for every outlet within 
the towns, with the highest tariff being paid by those who 
collect water from their neighbours’ taps and the lowest 
being for metered private connections. Tariff designs are 
complicated, based on the type of water supply, irrespec-
tive of the service and the social status of customer. Table 
1 indicates the water tariffs at different outlets in the two 
small towns.
Tariff increases following the entry of the private sector 
participants are in most cases expected to be substantial, 
especially during the transition from public to private sec-
tor provision in a commercialisation process. However, in 
the Ugandan situation, tariffs did not change, and there was 
an identified improvement in other service characteristics 
without necessarily changing the tariff.
Table 1 Cost of water at different water outlets
Parameter
Lugazi
(Ushs) 
Lyantonde 
(Ushs) 
Government subsidised connection 
charge per customer 50,000 50,000
Cost per metered m3 at each 
metered outlet 1,000 1,500
Cost per 20 litre container (jerrycan) 
from a public tap 33.33 50.00
Cost per 20 litre container (jerrycan) 
from a household private tap 50.00 75.00
Exchange rate: 1US Dollar = 2,000 Ushs (July 2003)
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Metering, billing and collection
Although there was nothing to attribute universal metering 
of connections to the private sector involvement in water 
supply services in small towns, there are indications that 
the management contracts have had a further impact on the 
metering of connections. Arising from this observation, one 
of the first effects of PSP has been a massive increase in the 
proportion of metered connections. Bill collections from 
private customers, especially the politicians and Government 
institutions, improved due to the private sector adopting a 
strict disconnection policy, though the account receivables 
from Government do take relatively long time. 
Privatisation and services to the poor
The PSP process in Uganda has not been designed to provide 
different services to the poor and less politically powerful. 
Instead, the poor without private connections in society pay 
the highest bill per unit volume of water consumed. There 
are common political statements made about provision of 
“free water for all”, and these are seen as intended to gain 
popularity than benefiting all segments of society, includ-
ing the poor. 
Issues to learn from the Ugandan 
experience of management contracts
In general, private sector experience using management 
contracts in water supply services has been successful, with 
many areas to learn from in large cities, municipalities and 
towns. The following issues can be learnt from the Ugandan 
case study on the performance of management contracts in 
small towns and rural growth centres.
1. There appear to be justification for aggregation of services 
through combining small towns in a similar geographical 
location under one Water Authority and a private operator 
in order to effectively monitor the performance of the 
private sector, and offer effective regulation. Aggregation 
should however be undertaken with caution, to avoid a 
situation where the number of towns becomes too big 
as to make it difficult for local private sector firms to 
operate the system successfully.
2. There is need to strengthen the regulatory role of govern-
ment for delegated water supply management through 
an independent body, whether services are in large 
municipalities or small towns.
3. While it is always assumed that the public services are 
prone to corruption and abuse, there is need to strengthen 
improvement in transparency and accountability in the 
private sector as well. 
Conclusions
The research looked at a variety of issues in an attempt to 
comprehensively review the performance of management 
contracts in small towns in Uganda. In general, the manage-
Regulation
In Uganda, there is no credible regulatory framework for 
private sector participation in the water sector, and the 
capacity to administer complex arrangements for private 
sector participation in the water sector over a long term is 
considered to be weak. The reform process had anticipated 
that DWD would be strengthened to take on the role of a 
national regulator while the regulatory function is being 
developed. 
Water supply systems are operated as single entities, and 
different types of costs, revenues and monitoring are the 
responsibility of different local governments. Each town is 
responsible for the operation and maintenance of its water 
supply system, operating through an individual Water Board. 
DWD as the agency in charge of monitoring the contracts 
acts as the closest to a regulator, but it is acting more as a 
procurement and advisory entity with residual responsibility 
of price setting. 
Performance reporting
The operational and investment inefficiencies of the sector 
had indicated lack of performance reports on unaccounted 
for water, billing and collection efficiency. Operational and 
overhead costs could not be generated easily for the sector 
in performance to benchmarked best practice. This was 
in spite of the fact that the water supplies were relatively 
recently constructed. Consolidated baseline data is actually 
missing, or not analysed to reflect the performance of the 
various water supply systems. There is presently available 
data on performance measurement in each town, and con-
solidated into monthly, quarterly and annual performance 
to inform policy makers at town level and nationally. Town 
Water Authorities have had several meetings to review the 
operations of the water supplies in the two towns based on 
the availed reports, and proposing improvements where 
necessary. Management contracts in a stepwise PSP ap-
proach have allowed government time to address issues of 
regulatory and information problems in the sector through 
building a database on the state of the water system in the 
sub sector.
Unaccounted for water (UFW)
A key research finding is that after two years from the start 
of the management contracts, physical UFW is still high at 
about 21% for newly constructed systems. While the contracts 
require the private operators to report on UFW, there is not 
anywhere reflected in the structure of the contract that the 
private operator was under any obligation to reduce UFW, 
and if so to what level. Work elsewhere had identified that 
though indicators such as UFW depend on factors that may 
be only partially within the control of a private operator, 
success in reducing physical losses actually depends on 
the government investing in rehabilitation of the systems. 
Nevertheless, positive trends in physical UFW reduction 
have been observed in the assessment process. The private 
operators do not as yet report on commercial losses as part 
of UFW.
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ment contracts have resulted to an improvement in water 
services. There are a number of findings relating not only to 
performance of management contracts, but to private sector 
participation in water and sanitation management, that were 
identified during the research. The broad conclusions from 
the study are that:
1. Pricing of water to reflect the production costs in small 
towns is likely to be unaffordable to consumers, because 
of the technology of water supply (and thus high levels 
of service), and the small number of customer base.
2. Private sector participation through use of management 
contracts for delivery of water services to communi-
ties in small towns and rural growth centres can lead 
to substantial benefits to consumers as in large cities 
and municipalities. The quality of services in terms of 
reliability, accessibility, continuity of supply and water 
quality can be ensured and/or improved. 
3. Private operators in management contracts assume no 
responsibility for capital investment, and the contract 
outputs are based on physical parameters. Consumers may 
have negative feelings on the entire PSP process if the 
service delivery is not improved based on responsibilities 
that fall in the domain of the contracting authority. 
4. Contrary to common statements from various media, 
delegating management to private sector operators does 
not necessarily lead to increase in the cost of water to 
consumers. There are situations in which without chang-
ing the cost of water and maintaining the water quality 
standards, delegating management to the private sector 
can yield improvements in other components of service 
delivery such as reliability of services, ensuring continu-
ity of water supply and substantially increasing the safe 
water coverage to the benefit of consumers. 
5. The contracting authorities have the responsibility for 
providing general framework for service delivery to the 
poor and the disadvantaged of the community. Without 
this, community members without private connections 
can end up paying the highest bill per unit volume of 
water they consume.
With appropriate provisions in the management contract, 
the private operator can apply service differentiation and 
pricing strategies to ensure provision of affordable services 
to the poor in the community. 
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